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PHILOSOPHICAL LANDMARKS 
BEING A SURVEY OF T H E  RECENT GAINS AND T H E  
PRESENT PROBLEMS OF REFLECTIVE 
THOUGHT1 
LECTURE I 
HEN John Milton wrote the “Areopagitica” and W predicted the future greatness of the English people, 
that people had staked its life upon its liberty, and was in 
danger of losing it. I t  was in the midst of the unspeakable 
disasters of civil war. During the centuries which have suc- 
ceeded Milton’s day the English nation has never ceased to 
struggle against obstructions without and obstacles within. It 
is a nation tried to its uttermost. But, on the whole, and to  
an extent which is rare in human affairs, its history has veri- 
fied the vision of the poet. I ts  prosperity in all matters of 
lasting worth has been very great. I t  has borne well the 
weight of its responsibilities, and, in spite of imperfections, 
it has so fulfilled its mission to  mankind that though Eng- 
land, like Israel, Greece, and Rome, were now to  perish, it 
would, like them, remain for  the human race a precious pos- 
session forever. 
It may be profitable for you, whose nationality has also 
“been welded not in peace but in the storm of battle,” to  in- 
quire what was the ground of the poet’s assured confidence 
in his country. W h a t  evidence lay there and then before 
him which would justify his trust in the destiny of his peo- 
ple? In  its circumstances there was none, for  these were 
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untoward to  the last degree. I t  had neither wealth of ma- 
terial resources, nor greatness of population, nor weight of 
armaments, nor vast extent of territory. I t  was a small and 
a poor people, without great traditions o r  high rank among 
the nations, and inhabiting a portion of a little island. 
Yet, with rarely paralleled political pride, Milton called 
upon “the Lords and Commons of England to  consider 
what Nation it was whereof they were, and whereof they 
were governors,” so that they might match the greatness of 
their trust. In  doing so, he referred solely to the intrinsic 
character of the people, and indeed to one element therein. 
H e  found them “a nation pliant and prone to  knowledge.” 
They “prized the liberty to know, to utter and to argue 
freely according to conscience, above all liberties.” I t  was 
only on this ground that the nation seemed to  the poet to  be 
“like an eagle renewing her mighty youth.” In  his sight she 
was first among the nations of his time, because she was first 
in her love of truth;  therefore was “she destined to be great 
and honourable in these later ages.” 
From one point of view we may say that there was noth- 
ing new in Milton’s attitude. T h e  truth to  which he gave 
such stately expression is, in fact, a truism. I t  is as old as 
man’s first reflection upon his own destiny. Homer  teaches 
it when he makes the Greeks advance to  battle in ordered 
and silent ranks, under wise commanders inspired by Athena, 
while the Trojans stream out in a confused and shouting 
mob, driven forward by Ares, the god who is the embodi- 
ment of animal ferocity and passion. This is the conviction 
of the wise in “all generations” : that if there be any law in 
human affairs o r  any continuity in their confused history, it 
is that which dwells in man’s own soul and secures the victory 
of the ordering intelligence and the disciplined will over the 
blind forces that operate in his world. 
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But from another point of view the attitude of iMilton 
may be called unique and even surprising. Stern moralist as 
he was, and a spirit which was devoted to the service of the 
Highest, we should have expected him to dwell first upon the 
ethical o r  the religious conditions of a nation’s welfare. But 
it is its “proneness and pliancy to knowledge,” and the store 
it set upon the liberty to know, to  which he assigns the high- 
est value and the first importance. 
H a d  he lived in our day, we should have reduced the sig- 
nificance of his mission and called him an “intellectualist” ; 
for we are prone to prize faith in some domains, and practice 
in others, above knowledge, and to regard “truth” as mere 
means to  a further good. I believe, however, that Milton 
spoke well and wisely. “The liberty to know” is in fact 
greater than all other liberties; for  it is their condition. 
M a n  cannot enter into his inheritance, whether that inheri- 
tance be natural o r  spiritual, except through this door. As 
the beauty of the natural scene is there only to  the seeing eye, 
so the utilities of Nature’s forces and the treasury of her 
resources are open only to him who can comprehend them; 
and the obligations which are  also the opportunities of man’s 
moral achievement exist only for  him who adopts them as 
the convictions of his own mind and the purposes of his own 
will. Efficient practice, whether on the minutest o r  on the 
widest scale, rests upon clear and relevant knowledge. I t  is 
as necessary to the artisan in handling his tools as it is t o  a 
statesman guiding the affairs of a nation. T h e  fact which is 
not comprehended is an outer necessity which limits man’s 
freedom, frustrating his intelligence and obstructing his will. 
T h e  discoveries and inventions of modern science in all their 
wide range, and man’s whole progress in civilization, bear 
witness to this truth : it is the intelligence of man which alone 
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can emancipate him. Hi s  charter of freedom is inscribed in 
her own soul. 
Now it is the main characteristic of our time that it has, at 
least in one great department, laid this lesson well to  heart. 
W e  consider no labor too severe o r  continued, no equipment 
too costly, which promises, by means of the natural sciences, 
to secure more intimate communion between the reason of 
man and the reason which is embedded in the physical order. 
I t  is only in this way that we can bring its powers to  our will. 
W e  have learned that the iron-hearted mechanism of nature, 
which were it not for  man’s rational endowment would en- 
tangle him in its vast scheme, can by means of his under- 
standing of it be changed into the rich possession of his mind 
and the instrument of his will. I ts  unchangeable and in- 
exorable laws, seized by way of their meaning, are made to 
minister to  his purposes and to  express his spontaneity. By 
means of knowledge man stands a sovereign among the 
natural powers, and he is free, not in their despite, but bv 
their help, for they enlarge the scope of his effective will. 
This, indeed, is the ultimate and by fa r  the most significant 
consequence of man’s intelligent converse with the outer 
world, the greatest of all the gifts of the natural sciences to 
mankind. But it is not that which has attracted our atten- 
tion. As a rule, we trace the influence of the theoretical dis- 
coveries of science no further than the practical inventions in 
which they result; and if we discern, we do  not reflectively 
consider, the manner in which they recoil upon man himself. 
T h e  achievement upon which in this age we justly pride our- 
selves is the interpretation of Nature’s laws, and our conse- 
quent sway over her energies. W e  seek little more, and we 
look no further, as a rule. W e  forget that it is the indirect, 
the remote, the unexpected and unsought consequences of 
man’s actions which mean most. I t  is a law of his life, and a 
Philosophical Landmarks 199 
symbol of the generosity of the scheme within which he lives, 
that he always builds more wisely than he knows. H e  is 
guided unconsciously as by an architectonic mind, which 
comprehends him and his environment, and whose purposes 
he cannot guess until he beholds them accomplished. 
I t  is my purpose to  call your attention to this aspect of the 
scientific enterprise which you are so auspiciously inaugurat- 
ing here to-day. I would fain indicate the manner in which 
the natural sciences, for which you are making your most 
generous provision, must not only extend your mastery over 
the outer world, but reverberate within your inner selves, en- 
riching and enlarging the powers of your rational nature. 
When man’s thought sets free the forces of the open 
world, these take up his deeds and carry them forward to 
issues which he cannot clearly foresee, and yet which he dare 
not leave unconsidered. For  these also yield their best gifts 
only to the spirit which can at once obey and control them; 
and neither the obedience nor the control is possible except 
in the measure in which they are comprehended. 
This consequence is seen to follow the moment we discern 
what takes place when man acquires knowledge of any 
object. I t  is that the nature of mind is itself exhibited in the 
process. He cannot enter into closer communion with the 
natural world by means of the sciences without at the same 
time both manifesting and realizing the powers of his own 
soul. Mind, like every other form of energy, natural and 
spiritual, shows what it is in what it does. I t  exhibits itself 
in its operations. I t  is by matching his intellectual power 
against the world and forcing its obdurate facts to  yield their 
meaning that he reveals the splendor of his rational endow- 
ment. Could we have known the potencies which slumber 
within him, i f  we could have known his mind and his ways of 
life when the phenomena of nature, instead of being open to 
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his thought and subservient to  his will, were nothing more 
than objects of fear and wonder? Or is it not true, rather, 
that the process by which he has gradually withdrawn the 
veil from the face of nature and brought to  light order 
among its contingencies, is the same in its other and great 
aspect as the process of the self-revelation of his own spirit? 
Fo r  knowledge comes neither from mind nor from its object, 
but from both. I t  is neither a posteriori nor a priori, be- 
cause it is both the one and the other, and that always. 
T ru th  is neither unveiled by man, nor is it given to  him 
ready-made. I t  is, in every item of it, the result of the inter- 
action of mind and its object. Light springs from the impact 
of spirit and nature. Nay, as we shall see more fully here- 
after, these imply each other, they are elements in one 
scheme, opposed but complementary aspects of the one real- 
ity. And it is only in their unity that they have significance, 
value, o r  use. 
I do not anticipate any contradiction when I say that the 
greatest and by fa r  the most significant of all the conse- 
quences of man’s triumphant progress in his comprehension 
of the physical cosmos is the light which that process has 
thrown upon man himself. But its full meaning can be seen 
only when we consider another and a still remoter conse- 
quence. Man’s more intimate communion with nature by 
means of natural science has brought him into closer com- 
munion with his fellows. Seeking no such end, the sciences 
have made men, throughout the civilized world, members of 
one another. They  have broken down man’s isolation, re- 
futed his egoism even when it leaves him selfish, made him 
independent whether they will o r  no, welded their interests 
together, and constituted them into organs of a vast whole 
to which they give and from which they borrow all the 
elements of their larger life. Within it they find their in- 
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dividual functions; and, seeking their own ends, they never- 
theless constitute a vast, complex, and single whole whose 
elements collaborate even when they conflict, and whose 
power for all human purposes no man can measure. 
T h e  first revelation of the potencies which slumbered in 
man’s spirit was made when the reason within him succeeded 
in holding rational communion with the reason that is em- 
bedded in the physical cosmos. But this second revelation is 
greater. W e  can see his powers in the fullness of their 
might when he is thus united in one scheme with his fellows, 
and spirit communes face to face with spirit. Then  is the 
range of his personality in truth extended, and the reach of 
his mind and will. T h e  blacksmith at his forge, like the 
thinker in his study, is seen to  serve and to  be served by the 
interchanging enterprises of the general mind of his times. 
For it is no flight of rhetoric, but the simple truth, to  say that 
our interests now are cosmopolitan. This is illustrated in 
the common ways of our daily life: in the food we eat, the 
clothes we wear, and the tools we use. T h e  same change 
which has passed over the face of nature has passed over the 
spirit of man. Science is translating facts into instances of 
universal laws. I t  is tearing facts out of their seeming isola- 
tion. I t  is revealing them as temporary resting-places of 
unresting energies, momentary combinations of forces which 
have come from the beginning of things and are moving on- 
ward on an endless way. Nature is no longer an aggregate 
of disconnected facts, o r  the scene of contingent happenings. 
It is the realm of concrete universal laws. These have not 
supplanted the facts, it is true, nor arrested the happenings; 
but they have illumined them, showing that they are the mere 
foci of the world’s unresting energies. 
But the universal in nature is at once the offspring and the 
parent of the universal in man: so that he too, by the indirect 
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influence of the sciences, is being reinterpreted and regen- 
erated. M a n  remains, it is true, and must remain, a unique 
personality. To  the end he will maintain his subjective in- 
tegrity and inviolable privacy; he will look upon the wide 
world through his own most individual thought, and act upon 
it from the secret depths of his own most exclusive will. But 
the thought and the will which are his own and exclusive are 
capable of a wide comprehension. H e  is also being revealed 
as an individuated organ of a vast whole. H e  is the intense 
because the self-conscious focus of the meaning and the use 
of the world. H e  is a pulse-throb of a universal mind which 
sustains the natural order, and operates in him, through him, 
by him, and, I believe, for  him. And this discovery, it seems 
to  me, is the crowning achievement of the modern age. Its 
interest in the meaning of the outer world, and the conse- 
quent conversion of its forces into man’s ministrants, have, 
without man’s knowledge o r  purposed seeking, begun the in- 
tegration of humanity, and set it forth on an adventure more 
generous in its promise than he can compass by his freest 
thoughts. 
Now it has seemed to me that if a votary of philosophy 
has any mission among you to-day, it is to  invite your atten- 
tion for a little to  this vaster and remoter realm of the con- 
sequences of devoting your thoughts in this institution to  the 
discovery of nature’s secrets. Fo r  every truth attained 
breaks out into a new problem demanding a new solution; 
every practical achievement brings into it a new task; and 
every goal of spirit is a point of departure on new adven- 
tures. And it is the peculiar task of philosophy to  suggest 
to the minds of men the regions not yet conquered and the 
inheritance not yet gained and secured. 
T h e  main outlines of our next adventure are becoming 
obvious. It is to  comprehend the laws according to  which 
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this new world of the interconnected wills of men must oper- 
ate. T h e  demand for knowledge-for knowledge that is 
systematic, tried, and secure-of this world of man is al- 
ready felt to be urgent in some directions. I presume that 
there is no maker o r  seller of material things among you 
who does not know that if he is to secure his own economical 
well-being, he must know something of the world’s mind and 
be able to interpret and anticipate its wants. This problem 
is infinitely more complex, and the risks of error  are incal- 
culably greater than they were when human society consisted 
of small, isolated, simple, self-centered and self-supporting 
units. H i s  success or  his failure in his business enterprises 
comes upon him from the ends of the world, and he must 
widen the range of his purposes. 
But what applies to the economic phase of our modern life 
applies in like manner to  aZZ its elements. Control can come 
only by the way of comprehension, and forces which we do 
not understand are inexhaustible sources of risks and sur- 
prises. And who comprehends the social forces of these 
times? All the civilized nations of the world exhibit the 
same phenomena. W e  have emancipated the people; we 
have awakened their sense of their rights; we have multi- 
plied their wants and extended the range of their desires; 
and, in one word, we have ushered in what we can hardly do 
more than name and fear-namely, Democracy. I t  is a thing 
which is to be its own law; it is to walk in the light of its own 
convictions; it is to map out the lines of its own welfare; it is 
to repudiate every authority, political, moral, o r  religious, 
which wears a despotic face; it must issue its own impera- 
tives, and every appeal is to itself alone. 
T h e  greatest discovery ever made by man was made by 
the Greeks when, cutting themselves free from the traditions 
of the ancient world, they alighted upon the conception of a 
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civil state where citizens should be free. T h e  most momen- 
tous experiment of mankind is that of carrying out their con- 
ception to  its ultimate consequence in a true democracy. But 
that experiment, conducted among the elemental powers of 
man’s world and involving all the major issues of his wel- 
fare, is carried on in the bewildering twilight of mere opin- 
ion. First, appearances are taken for  facts; there is little 
inquiry, and there is less logic or  method. T h e  democracies 
of the world, guided by no prophetic seer and possessing 
little light of their own, are stumbling along an untried and 
unknown way to an unimagined goal. They are convinced 
of their illusions only by suffering their consequences, and 
they discover the truth only by exhausting the possibilities of 
error. I t  is a costly method and an insecure one. Universal 
unrest verging constantly toward conflict characterizes all 
their ways. 
I do not think that we can trust this method much longer. 
T h e  need for  self-comprehension is becoming urgent. T h e  
risks of ignoring the problems of the general life of man are 
growing greater as the democracies wax in magnitude and 
strength, assert themselves with less and less reserve, and 
are less and less patient of restraint. And, moreover, a fun- 
damental discrepancy has arisen between the inner or  self- 
conscious life of recent times and its outward circumstances. 
Man’s knowledge and control of himself have fallen out of 
step with his knowledge and control of his physical environ- 
ment. In  the case of the latter the boundaries of the nations 
are overleapt and the exclusiveness of their individualism is 
multiplied. Scientific knowledge and inventions and the vast 
economic resources which issue from them are objects of cos- 
mopolitan interchange. But our ethical temperament has 
received no such enlargement or  emancipation, and is still 
narrow and class-tainted and parochial. And this dis- 
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crepancy will bring its penalties. H a v e  you ever known any 
instance of incongruence between the inner and outer con- 
ditions of a nation’s life which has not been fraught with 
peril? I t  is this cause which divides a nation against itself 
and constrains it to  have recourse to  the violent remedy of 
revolution. A reinterpreted world is a reconstructed world. 
I t  propounds new problems for  man. And they are like the 
riddles of the Sphinx: they must be answered on pain of 
death; they have no answer except M a n  himself. 
Surveying the modern situation as a whole, what is it, 
then, that we see? I t  is the vast extent of the domain which 
the physical sciences have conquered within so brief a period 
of the history of the human race that it seems but the hour of 
the dawn ; the great army of explorers in every civilized land, 
equipped with every instrument which can aid their search, 
who are year by year and almost day by day pressing its 
boundaries further; the growing marvel of the practical in- 
ventions which follow hard upon the theoretic discoveries; 
the utilities, latent from the beginning of time in the struc- 
ture of the physical world, which these inventions are setting 
free;  and, on the other hand, the inexhaustible variety and 
unconfined range of man’s wants and desires which all these 
things have called into existence, and which are clamorous for 
satisfaction ; the complex, restless, tumultuous, and yet un- 
ruled world of industry and commerce which has been welded 
together and is designed to  meet these wants ; the consequent 
integration of mankind into organized communities; the rise 
of the great order of national, political states which are 
themselves but organs of a still wider humanity, all of them 
from time to time disturbed and occasionally well-nigh dis- 
traught by the economic and social collisions of their ele- 
ments. Such are the results which we must attribute mainly 
to  the devotion and the triumphant progress of modern 
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science. Guided and inspired by them, the multitudinous ac- 
tivities of individual minds and wills, each of them perma- 
nently set upon its own personal ends, have put together a 
vast social structure with almost as little conscious purpose 
as that which guides the coral insects building their reefs 
amid the ocean’s waves. T h a t  structure has its own laws of 
being and ways of operating, and these are as remorseless as 
the laws of the physical cosmos. But I believe that they are 
as beneficent, too, provided they are understood. How,  
then, can we doubt that man must fit himself for this new 
world which he has called into being, o r  that in order to do  
so he must go forth on a new adventure? It is not only that 
of comprehending the physical world and employing its 
energies, but of comprehending the master-power which is 
the cause of the great change. Side by side with the sciences 
of Nature, the sciences of man must arise. M a n  must come 
back to himself, contemplating the mystery of his own spirit! 
for in it is the key of the final enigma of the world. 
But this is the specific venture of Philosophy, and Philos- 
ophy has fallen into disrepute. So scanty has been the har- 
vest of her long toil, as compared with that which the natural 
sciences have brought triumphantly home, that the general 
mind of the modern age would turn away from her. Phi- 
losophy, the mother of all the sciences, has now to plead, and 
even a t  times to plead in vain, for permission to  erect a hum- 
ble lodge among the mansions of her daughters. W e  would 
prize her gifts beyond all others, could she but bring them 
within our reach. But we despair of her powers. Even the 
incomplete, tentative, errant, but slowly progressive inter- 
pretation which man alone can give of any object, seems to  
be impossible for us when our problem is Man. An obstacle 
lies across the very threshold of this, the most urgent as well 
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as the greatest of man’s spiritual enterprises: it is his diffi- 
dence when face to  face with the mystery of his own being. 
And, in truth, the mystery is very great. Even his physical 
structure is revealed by science to  be the consummation and 
the most complex epitome of the cosmic scheme, and all its 
problems converge in him. And his soul, his mind, his spirit 
is the self-conscious counterpart of all his world. H e  is its 
expression, in him brute force emerges into meaning, and its 
reality takes upon itself the form of truth. T h e  complexity 
of the problem is infinite, and the consciousness of its magni- 
tude paralyzes the inquiry of philosophy. 
Moreover, when we are dealing with spirit and its mani- 
festations in any one of the arts o r  sciences, o r  in the most 
complex social world in which all these are sustained, the 
method which has been so successful in the investigation of 
the facts of the outer world cannot be employed, except at 
the greatest risk and under constant correction. T h e  natural 
sciences can, without much violence to  their object, distin- 
guish and even isolate its aspects and deal with them sepa- 
rately. But when we leave the physical sphere, where 
relations are relatively external and contingent, and ascend 
stage by stage along the internal relations of organic life to  
the intense unity of self-consciousness, in which all differences 
are at once sustained and overcome, abstraction becomes 
more and more misleading. There  every element depends 
for its being, function, and meaning upon the whole system of 
which it is a part. T h e  problem of the whole comes upon 
us everywhere, and it seems impossible to attain any truth 
without grasping it in its totality. 
I t  follows that philosophy has no more right to be 
abstract than a work of art, or to be fragmentary than re- 
ligious faith. Even the pragmatist, whose main mission 
seems to be to maintain that the world is, at least in part, the 
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playground of contingencies, must make the apparently pre- 
posterous claim of pronouncing upon its final nature and 
grasping it as a whole. H e  also is “a spectator of all time 
and all existence,” and its condemning judge. 
And it follows that even as an outline the philosopher’s 
version of the universe of reality must fail, and fail in every 
way. Its principles are mere hypotheses, and nothing is 
fully demonstrated. T h e  application of the hypotheses to 
facts is incomplete on every side; they retain their secrets, 
remain enigmatic, and they seem to conflict with one another 
and with the system as a whole. And the failure of philos- 
ophy, which we might well prognosticate from the magnitude 
of its task, seems to be more than indorsed by its troubled 
and apparently futile history. W e  are driven to think that 
the enterprise exceeds our powers, that there is no resource 
in reason, and that the philosopher must take his seat among 
humble men, and say, like them, 
I stretch lame hands of fa i th  and grope, 
A n d  gather dust and chaff, and call 
To what  I feel  is L o r d  of all, 
A n d  faintly trust the larger hope. 
And man cannot set aside the enigma. H e  must persist in 
the attempt. But the question arises, W h y  do men persist in 
the attempt? And the wisest of men, why do  they not turn 
aside from the vast inquiry and “cultivate their gardens”? 
Can it be that it is impossible for them to  do  so without 
violating their own rational nature? Is there some necessity 
either in man himself, o r  in the nature of things, o r  in both, 
which he cannot escape, but which constrains him to  confront 
the mystery? Can he not take refuge in his own limitations? 
W h a t  reflective man is ignorant of the answer? 
Philosophical Landmarks 209 
Just when w e  are safest, there’s a sunset-touch, 
A fancy froin a power-bell, some one’s death,  
A chorus-ending f r o m  Euripides,- 
A n d  that’s enough for fifty hopes and fears,  
As old and new at  once as Nature’s self ,  
To rap  and knock and enter in our soul, 
T a k e  hands and dance there, a fantastic ring, 
Round  the ancient idol, on his base again,- 
T h e  grand Perhaps! 
This fact, sustained by the experience of mankind always 
and in all ages when it is at its best, sustained by its despair 
no less than by its hopes, by its agnosticism and skepticism 
no less than by its faith, leads us to look again a t  the adven- 
ture of philosophy and its assumed failure. W h a t  does it 
mean? 
In the first place, it throws a fresh light upon the nature 
of man. I t  shows that he cannot escape the sense of his in- 
finite environment. T o  shut it out of his mind were to rend 
his own spirit in twain, for it enters within. T h e  infinite is 
part of the furniture of his soul. H e  is like a dweller on a 
little island in the midst of the open ocean, everywhere 
within the sound of the thunder of the breakers. If he en- 
deavors to satisfy himself with a narrow scheme of life, he 
finds that he is at war both with himself and with the nature 
of things. H e  may seek satisfaction, as Carlyle and many 
others have advised, by lowering his demands and limiting 
his outlook. H i s  first crude expositions of himself reveal 
within nothing but animal wants on a large scale, and he 
may neither see nor desire to  find in the world around any- 
thing except that which promises to stay their hunger. But 
reflection enters if the process of his own rational life is not 
arrested within him, and reflection breaks down his com- 
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placency and dispels the fake show of first appearances. H i s  
spirit is launched forth on its endless task. 
And this is philosophy. I t  is not the quaint guest of star- 
struck souls which have forgotten their finitude and are  
doomed to range along the horizon of existence, peering into 
the darkness beyond and asking questions of its emptiness. 
Philosophy is the process whereby man, driven by the neces- 
sities of his rational nature, corrects the abstractions of his 
first sense-steeped experience, and endeavors, little by little, 
to bring to  light and power the real-that is, the spiritual- 
meaning of his structure and of the world in which he lives. 
I cannot believe in a destiny so cruel as to  condemn man to  
seek and to  return home empty. I even venture to say that 
the quest is never vain. 
I t  is true that philosophy does not reach its goal, if that 
goal is a full and flawless and final scheme. But is i t? 
Which of the enterprises of the human spirit either has, o r  
ought to  have, such a consummation? Not  the sciences, not 
any one of the arts, not any form of man’s practical activi- 
ties. There  is, with regard to every aim which he has sought 
to  attain, the same incompleteness, imperfection, and lack of 
finality, and the same ground for  skepticism to seize upon 
and condemn it. 
But, in the next place, the skepticism which distrusts phi- 
losophy is itself philosophy, and a philosophy which has not 
been careful to  examine its own assumptions. Let  me in- 
dicate a few of these as we pass on our way. 
In  the first place, it is evident that skepticism cannot con- 
demn except by reference to  a standard or  criterion, and that 
standard must itself be capable of justification, whether 
through carrying it within itself o r  as a means to  that which 
does so. I t  must itself, in fact, assume an Absolute, and a 
knowledge of it. Tha t  which pretends to  be true, even 
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though it be negative, bears within it a reference to  a final 
end, and in its own place and context to embody it. Hence 
skepticism cannot condemn a conception which it must as- 
sume and use in its condemnation. 
In the second place, the criterion set up by skepticism is 
not valid. Skepticism places a static goal for a nature which 
is through and through dynamic. It demands that mind 
should come to rest in a knowledge that is final. But self- 
consciousness is a process. To  arrest its activity is to extin- 
guish it. I t  is active no less in possessing than it is in 
achieving knowledge. For knowledge o r  goodness to  be, is 
to be in process of being maintained by the active powers of 
the intelligence and will: in other words, the moment that 
men cease to  think and to  will, these cease to  exist. They 
are in process of being continually produced. T h e  whole 
world of mind, like the physical cosmos, is the scene of the 
play of energies which never rest. I ts  existence is its becom- 
ing; it continues through continuous regeneration, and is ever 
new as well as always old. Both beginnings and endings are 
fictions. Man’s mind lives and moves within a self-inclosed 
system for  which to  be is to change, and probably also to 
evolve, radiating forever into new splendors. And for  man 
to live as spirit is to  partake in the process. I t  is in some 
other world than that of man’s experience that the skeptic 
should seek a reality that is fixed o r  a perfection that is 
static. 
In the third place, skepticism has not only assumed for 
mind an end which contradicts its nature, and is on that ac- 
count alone irrational as well as impossible: it has also mis- 
construed the process of knowing. I t  is represented as self- 
defeating. Instead of revealing the nature of things as they 
are, it exhibits them only in their relation to man’s means of 
knowing them, o r  as they are reflected in the medium of his 
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consciousness. This  is held to distort them; so that in strict- 
ness man does not know real things, but phenomenal objects. 
Mind cannot get into actual touch with reality. I t  is shut up 
within a world of appearances; consciousness can deal with 
its own contents and see only the pictures on its own walls. 
And, further, every attempt which philosophy has ever made 
to establish a relation between ideas and facts, o r  phenomena 
and real objects, has failed. And its failure is necessary and 
inevitable, for it is manifestly impossible for reason to estab- 
lish any relation between what is and what cannot be in 
consciousness. This  suspicion of thought, “this disease of 
subjectivity,” has penetrated deeply into the modern mind, 
and skepticism has assumed many forms. I t  is a t  times the 
positivism which affirms necessary ignorance of final causes : 
it is a t  others an agnosticism which endeavors to  stop short 
of both affirmation and negation; it is a t  other times an in- 
tuitionism which on occasions and for rare moments comes 
into touch with reality in a way that is inexplicable and 
miraculous; it is at other times a dogmatism of either the in- 
telligence o r  of the will that is a resolve to  affirm when we 
cannot know, a pragmatism o r  a pluralism. In all cases it 
relegates those things which man most desires to know into 
a region which lies beyond the reach of his intelligence, or it 
attributes to subconsciousness, o r  to mere feeling, o r  to mys- 
ticism and intuition, what it denies to  the use of man’s ra- 
tional faculties. 
T o  deal with these skeptical assumptions with any fullness 
lies beyond my immediate purpose. But we may observe in 
passing, what is obvious, namely, that the skeptic cannot con- 
demn all human knowledge without condemning his own. 
H i s  pronouncement on the nature of mind, the relativity of 
its processes, the phenomenal character of its objects, the 
Philosophical Landmarks 213 
unknowable nature of reality, must share the fate of all 
other knowledge. 
H e  must choose between denying the validity of all know- 
ledge and affirming his own, and in both cases alike his con- 
clusion is self-contradictory. 
But, in the next place, his attitude is exposed to other ways 
of refutation than that of a mere argumentum ad hominem 
or  a tu quoque. T h e  skeptic converts the condition which is 
necessary to knowledge against the possibility of knowledge, 
as i f  that which constitutes it could also destroy it. No 
doubt knowledge is relative; that is to  say, it depends upon 
the nature of mind as well as upon the nature of things. But 
is its relativity a defect? W h a t  would the skeptic have? Is 
it a mind which has no affinity with the world of objects, o r  a 
world which is divorced from, and independent of, the intel- 
ligence? T h e  relation of things to  mind and of mind to  
things may be an indication of the fundamental character of 
both. Indeed, there is no attribute of the real so indispu- 
table as that by which it interacts with mind, and through 
and by and only during that interaction exhibits and even 
realizes its fullness of being. Knowledge, o r  rather knowing 
--for there is no such ambiguous reality as ‘‘a world of 
knowledge” supposed to intervene between consciousness 
and the facts with which it deals--is the interaction of mind 
and things, and a living intercourse. And that intercourse is 
direct and immediate even when we form erroneous opin- 
ions. E r r o r  is the pathological activity of undeveloped 
minds. W e  borrow the whole contents of our intelligence 
from the world in which we live, even our illusions, and we 
can create neither truth nor falsehood out of the emptiness 
of an isolated and self-closed mind. On the other hand, the 
world owes to reason alone the evidence of its existence and 
the expression of its order and meaning. But we recognize 
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neither that which we borrow nor that which we lend, and 
we speak of parts of our knowledge as a priori and of parts 
as a posteriori, as i f  some truths were fabricated by our- 
selves without the aid of the world, and others were emitted 
by the world without the use of mind. Knowing is a joint 
enterprise in which both are involved. 
The re  is, perhaps, no phenomenon of modern thought 
which demands a closer diagnosis than this “disease of sub- 
jectivity,” which is not only a cause of the distrust of philos- 
ophy, but which would paralyze the enterprise of reason in 
all other directions, if in our practice, which is wider than our 
theories, we did not set it at naught. I t  seems to me to  rest, 
in the last resort, like all the forms of modern skepticism, 
upon unjustifiable dualisms. F o r  we have been separating 
when we ought only to have distinguished, and converting 
differences into contradictions. And, on the other hand, we 
have been assuming that to reconcile differences is to  remove 
them, leaving nothing but flat and stale sameness. W e  have 
not distinguished between sameness and identity, nor real- 
ized that identity can-and, I believe, must-express itself in 
change and maintain itself thereby. 
T h e  assumptions arise from the fact that we naturally 
carry over into our philosophical research the conceptions 
which we have found useful in our physical inquiries, and 
endeavor to interpret the phenomena of mind in the same 
way as objects in the outer world. As in space every part 
excludes every other, and its continuity allows no diversity: 
thus only, it is presupposed, can the reality of all objects, in- 
cluding minds, be maintained. They must, we assume, be 
kept in isolation. Their relations to  one another must be 
treated as contingent addenda : things into which they may 
enter and out of which they may live again, without any 
change in their real being. T o  be real, they exclude one an- 
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other, Interpenetration, the being of one object through and 
by reason of the being of other objects, is held not to  consti- 
tute but to  destroy. T h e  finite and the infinite must stand 
apart. T h e  will of man, if it is to be free-that is, i f  it is to 
be a will-must shut out the world. T h e  subject must have 
only a negative attitude to  objects; nature and spirit, mind 
and matter, must be absolute opposites. 
When I endeavor to catch a glimpse of the trend of the 
thought of the present times, and to  define, however gen- 
erally, the problems in which it finds itself entangled and 
which it must try to  solve, I find that it is occupied with some 
one o r  other of these dualisms. T h e  tissue of reality has 
been torn asunder; and if there be any movement which 
above all others is indicative of the special mission of the 
times which are coming, and are already at the door, it is 
that of healing the rent and of finally refuting all notions of 
the primacy either of the whole over its elements, o r  of the 
elements over the whole. W e  must find room for the free- 
dom of both mind and the world in knowledge; for both 
spiritual freedom and natural necessity in our practice; for 
both God and man in religion: for both individualism and 
socialism in our politics; for both the one and the many, the 
universal and the particular, everywhere ; and we must view 
them as interpenetrable; for  there is but one reality, and 
without its cooperation with its elements nothing exists o r  
happens. 
LECTURE I1
concluded the last lecture by showing that both in WE our thoughts and in our actions we first distinguish 
and then tend to sunder the contents of reality : our thoughts 
are always to  some degree abstract and our practical pur- 
poses one-sided. Reality, even at its simplest, has more 
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aspects than we can either recognize o r  use: it takes all the 
sciences, each of them taking up its own set of relations, to 
explain the qualities of a lump of iron ore;  and most, if not 
all, of our industries to extract its uses. All thoughts and all 
ends are abstract. 
But, among the conditions under which man lives, we must 
reckon as one of the most beneficent that he cannot be satis- 
fied with abstractions. Both his own nature and the nature 
of things conspire together to  secure him against narrowing 
the interests of his life. T h e  reflected elements of reality 
press for recognition ; and the elements which are recognized 
refuse to  yield either their truth o r  their use, except in their 
context. They  even refute themselves : one-sided truths be- 
come misleading errors, and one-sided purposes refuse to 
work. They  call forth their opposites, and demand to  be 
complemented and corrected by them and harmonized with 
them. T h e  world resists being shredded into parts, and 
persistently maintains its concrete totality. 
On the other hand, man’s own nature also constrains him 
to move and to  cooperate with the trend toward unity. 
Abstract experience is a mind divided against itself: it can- 
not stand. M a n  must either widen his outlook and extend 
the range of his purposes in response to  the call of circum- 
stance, o r  else do violence to  his own rational nature by be- 
coming the bondsman of habit and an automaton. And in 
either case he makes for some kind of completeness-either 
the completeness which shuts out o r  that which lays hands 
upon and utilizes the environment; and the process of ex- 
perience always changes him. T h e  final effect of the deeds 
of his intelligence and will does not lie in the truth attained, 
or in the purpose realized, but in the recoil of these deeds 
upon himself. H e  rises from his acts either with hardened 
habits and strengthened prejudices, o r  else with a mind en- 
Philosophical Landmarks 
riched with new ideas and a more effective will. N o r  by any 
means can he return to  his past. Strictly speaking, spirit has 
no past; for it always incorporates it with the present. Man  
gathers his experience into himself; carries it along with 
him, as an element in his mental structure, assimilated by his 
living personality. H e  can sometimes unravel his past out 
of his present by conscious memory directly demonstrating 
its presence within him ; and even if he cannot give this direct 
proof of the existence of the past in the present, he gives in- 
direct evidence of it either in the automatization of his life 
and the fixity and reiteration of his mental operations, or 
else in the added skill and compass of his thoughts and pur- 
poses. This arrestment of the past and its conversion into 
a living element in the moving life is the mark and marvel of 
the rational nature of man, distinguishing him above all 
other things from other beings, as the condition of his prog- 
ress. 
Moreover, it is in this way that he maintains his personal 
identity. Fo r  that consists not in any immutable sameness 
such as we attribute, rightly or wrongly, to  material exis- 
tence. T h e  self-extenuating space, the succession of the 
contents of time, each supplanting its predecessor, must be 
overcome and its flow arrested if personal identity is main- 
tained. And this is not possible except by the activity of a 
self-consciousness which retains the past by waking it into 
the present. Even the sameness o r  permanence of the outer 
order implies, as Kant has shown, the reintegrating activity 
of self-consciousness. Reason in man thus becomes ever more 
concrete, systematizes ever more fully both its own life-con- 
tent and its outer world. Its war with abstractions is per- 
petual : to lay down its arms is to yield its life. 
I t  is not a defect of human reason that it must reach the 
concrete by way of abstractions : it is its nature. E r r o r  does 
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not consist in merely entertaining abstractions, but in treating 
the abstractions as representative of the concrete whole of 
reality. I t  arises when man endeavors to fix the abstractions, 
o r  to employ them as final characterizations of reality. 
There  is a true sense in which human knowledge may be said 
to  begin with the particular and the simple, and to  make its 
way toward the universal and concrete-to start from “the 
Many” and to seek “the One.” But there is also a true 
sense in which knowledge may be said to  begin with the in- 
definite “an undistinguished continuum,” and to proceed to 
articulate and define its contents-to start from “the One” 
and to seek “the Many.” From the first point of view, our 
experience is at first a sensuous manifold which has to  be 
connected first into perceptions, then into conceptions, and 
finally into the organic and hyperorganic ideas of reason. 
And, pari passu ,  the object of experience, nature, a t  first 
appears to  be the scene of disconnected happenings and to  be 
a loose aggregate of unrelated facts, and eventually to  ap- 
pear as a universal cosmos. From the second point of view, 
our experience is at first a confused mass of sensations press- 
ing into us through the pores of sense, and perceptions arise 
by distinguishing and articulating. And the object of experi- 
ence, the world, changes its character in a corresponding 
way. Now error arises when either of these views is 
adopted against the other, o r  as the whole truth, and made 
the basis of a philosophical account of the real. And that it 
is an error is shown by the necessity of correcting the original 
hypothesis by means of its opposite. Fo r  whichever presup- 
position we assume at the beginning is nothing but a starting- 
point from which its complementary opposite must be 
reached. If the pluralist begins with the Many, particulars 
he must confessedly synthesize and unite; if the absolutist 
begins with the One, the indefinite whole he must analyze and 
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articulate. Philosophers may differ as to the nature of real- 
ity, and their doctrines may range between an absolutism or  
pantheism that engulfs the many and deletes all differences, 
and a pluralism o r  monadism. I t  is true that neither on the 
side of its difference nor of its unity is human knowledge 
complete-that is to  say, the distinctions which are made are 
not clear, differences escape our observation; and, on the 
other hand, the unity in which they are comprised may have 
both little compass and little significance. But pure differ- 
ence and pure sameness baffle the intelligence by their mean- 
inglessness; indeed, neither can be affirmed o r  denied except 
in relation to  its opposite. Every judgment, every opinion, 
false or  true, wide o r  narrow its influence, implies differ- 
ences within a unity, and is always a system. T h e  assump- 
tion of pure particularity which the pluralist makes, and of 
pure unity or  sameness which the absolutist makes, is not 
valid of the object of knowledge at  any stage, from the 
crudest ordinary consciousness to the completest constructive 
height of the speculative philosopher. T h e  problem of pass- 
ing either from the Many to  the One, o r  from the One to the 
Many, is insoluble; but it is also a problem that the human 
mind is not obliged to ask. I t  is a problem asked neither by 
the nature of things nor by the nature of reason. It is as 
unnecessary and as insoluble as the problem of proving that 
2 x 2 = 9 I .  And the way to deal with such a problem is not 
to ask it. T h e  several philosophies which ask the question 
are the ordines of abstraction, and their error is revealed 
whenever the abstractions are faithfully pressed home. 
They will then be seen not only to  call forth, but to pass into, 
their opposites, and thus to refute their own starting-point. 
A general survey of the reflective thought of the present 
day will prove, I believe, that it is engaged upon this task; 
and its main province lies in the explicitness of the assump- 
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tions and the rigor with which they are being followed to 
their conclusions. A t  no previous time were the advocates 
of the Many and of the One so frankly opposed or so evenly 
balanced, nor their contradiction more direct and full. Ex- 
cept in one o r  two instances, pluralism exists in order to  com- 
plete absolutism, and means to have no mission except to 
maintain the existence of contingency and multiplicity, and it 
must itself perish in the hour of its victory. But the plural- 
ism which aims a t  being constructive is an unusually interest- 
ing phenomenon, and much more characteristic of the times 
than the absolutism which it would refute and supplant. 
As a matter of fact, the absolutism which is supposed to  
begin with a bare “universal” o r  “One,” and to proceed to 
evolve the varied contents of experience from that “One,” 
employing an a priori method of mere analysis, need not 
detain us. Such a method may have been employed by the 
Eleatics, and can be attributed, not without justice, to  Spi- 
noza. I t  is also supposed by critics to be employed by Hegel 
and his followers. But it does not concern us at present to 
determine by whom the theory is o r  has been maintained, 
nor under what great names it may shelter itself; for we are 
not engaged with the history of philosophy. W e  need not 
seek to  ascertain whether the Absolute of Hegel stood for an 
empty One, o r  for the whole of reality as it is in all its con- 
creteness in itself and for itself. Only the first, as the 
abstract Absolute, engages the attention of the pluralist and 
concerns us. 
But it concerns us only to be dismissed. I admit at once, 
and without any reservation, that philosophy cannot begin 
from such an Absolute: that i f  it could begin, it could find no 
way from it to  the rich complexity of real being; and that the 
method of mere analysis and a priori deduction can elicit 
nothing out of its emptiness. No doubt the psychological 
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history of man’s mind may give evidence of a process by 
which the indefinite mass of its original sensuous conscious- 
ness is distinguished into elements and sights and sounds, and 
even the Ego  and the non-Ego are practically defined and 
their differences made explicit. But absolutists are held to 
be guilty of neglect, or even contempt, of psychological evi- 
dence rather than of converting psychology into a metaphys- 
ical absolutism, though I should find great difficulty in 
admitting its existence elsewhere than in the minds of its 
critics. 
But it is not so with the opposite theory, which professes 
to start with “the Many” and to  seek “the One”; which 
maintains that particulars are given and universals are 
found; that experience proceeds from discrete sensations to 
perceptions, and from perceptions to more general Goncep- 
tions, and from those to the still wider “ideas of reason”; 
and that the object of experience, the whole region of or- 
dered facts, presents itself at first as the scene of separate, 
individual occurrences, and an aggregate of things real in 
their independence of one another, each of them isolated, 
impervious, exclusive, an object of simple apprehension. 
T h e  pluralists maintain, in so f a r  as they are logically faith- 
ful to their fundamental hypothesis, that such is the true or 
final character of reality. If we affirm its unity as a whole, 
o r  the harmony of its elements in virtue of any universal 
principle o r  law of being, we go beyond our evidence: we 
even flout the facts. All the objects of man’s thought are 
finite; even God is one among, or, what comes to  the same 
thing, one above and over above, other beings. Real exist- 
ence implies singularity. A thing, in order to be, must be 
itself, must carry within it a private core, which is its own 
true being, and which remains its very self, whatever rela- 
tions it may enter into or come out of. 
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All realities are particulars, we are told. Nothing exists 
beside particulars. There  is “no unity” or  common element, 
no real or existential universals, which exist o r  subsist in 
addition to the particulars. There  are no things-in-general, 
and no events-in-general, Nothing exists which corresponds 
to such a general conception as “animal” or “tree” or 
“man”; but only this o r  that animal o r  tree o r  man. N o r  is 
there any universal substrate which constitutes them into a 
class. A class is due to our classification: it is an idea, not a 
thing. W e  may, and do, find similarity between different 
objects: but each of them exists in and by itself, and the 
similarity is an idea which we form by comparing them with 
one another. Anything that destroys their intrinsic singu- 
larity o r  uniqueness destroys them: for them to be is to be 
each its own unique self. 
How,  then, do we account for  law and order? I t  is sim- 
ply and purely the outcome of intelligence. Everything that 
exists is its own law, an active essence, o r  character, behav- 
ing in its own particular way. There  are, therefore, no 
repetitions in the realm of the real, any more than there are 
similarities, and no absolute fixity. Repetition, enumeration, 
measurement, mathematics are not possible except by ab- 
straction, and are not true of any real existences. “All 
our assertions of identity among reals are a t  bottom nega- 
tive, amount simply to saying that we discern no difference.” 
But what comes of this view of the universal laws, which 
science seeks to establish, and the uniformity of nature which 
they postulate? Does not this doctrine “let contingency into 
the very heart of things”? Must not a perfectly discrete 
world be in every part  of it unintelligible? T h e  consistent 
pluralist answers these questions in the affirmative. So f a r  
as science deals in universals, it does not touch the reality of 
things. Thought must start from the particular, but it can- 
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not return to it. Thought gives us only the universal, and 
universals are only hypostasized epistemological entities. 
Facts and universals, in short, belong to different orders : 
the former to  the world of objective reality, the latter to  the 
objective world of knowledge. Moreover, they do not even 
correspond. T h e  universals are not true-that is, they indi- 
cate no existing realities, as perceptions may do. T h e  so- 
called laws, and the universal and necessary causes of which 
natural science speaks, correspond to nothing that exists in 
reality. There  are  no laws o r  necessities o r  uniformities of 
nature. These are  mere results of our own thinking, concep- 
tions fabricated by our minds through observing, selecting, 
summarizing and generalizing the multitudinous, particular 
occurrences which really take place. “In the real world we 
can nowhere find that exact similarity which the mathema- 
tician can readily conceive, and the contention is that  it no- 
where exists.” “There are  never two beings which are 
perfectly alike, and in which it is not possible to  find an 
internal difference” ; and, a fortiori, no two events or  occur- 
rences o r  activities can be identical. There  is, to  our loose 
and general observation, an apparent repetition of events, of 
acts in the world, and we speak of “same causes” and “same 
effects” ; but sameness and uniformity, together with the con- 
tinuity and necessity which are assumed to spring from them, 
are  mere thoughts. There  are no natural laws, nor any real 
being corresponding to any concepts the physicist can find it 
convenient to  frame regarding the ultimate constituents of 
matter. Continuity must destroy particularity. Each real 
thing has its own unique constitution. Pluralism thus does 
not hesitate “to let contingency into the very heart of 
things.” “I not only admit it,” says Dr. Ward ,  “but contend 
that any other world would be meaningless.” 
But there is another application of this pluralism to which 
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I must briefly refer. I t  is its application to  the subjects of 
knowledge. T h e  particularity, uniqueness, and exclusiveness 
which is the essential character or  true being and essence of 
natural things, is attributed to  minds, and to  their experi- 
ences. Every mind exists, and for  itself. There  is no con- 
tinuity between o r  in them, and each is absolutely impervious. 
Every mind maintains the absolute isolation of its own being. 
And the same holds of their experiences-or the same would 
hold i f  any general affirmation could be true. T h e  presenta- 
tions of one man cannot become the presentations of an- 
other. Every mind is the exclusive owner or  retainer of its 
own truths and its own errors. T o  every self its own world, 
to  every Ego its own non-Ego. Above all else, we must not 
play fast and loose with the uniqueness and isolation-with 
the being in itself and for  itself-of personality, o r  of its ex- 
perience. 
H o w  can they disagree? 
H o w  is any communication between them possible? Not  by 
changing places, not in such a way that “the presentations of 
one could become accessible to the others.” “This is just the 
most impossible thing in the world. Individuality consists 
precisely in this impossibility.” There is no element com- 
mon to  the several experiences. Each monad mirrors its 
world “from a unique standpoint of its own.” Universal 
truth, in the sense of a truth that is possessed or  attainable 
by all minds, has to  go the way of all other universals ; and 
if general conceptions are still possible, they are  possible only 
in the sense that every mind has its own private stock of 
them. There  are thus as many experiences as there are  per- 
sons, and as many sciences as there are scientific men-prob- 
ably more. And they are  all interpretations, equally true or  
equally false-if, indeed, either falsity o r  truth can appertain 
to different worlds where every mind has its own object. 
How, then, can they agree? 
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Pluralism implies solipsism. “So f a r  as reality consists in 
particulars, so fa r  it pertains to each experience for  itself 
alone; and so f a r  the solipsist in theory, and the egoist, a 
solipsist in conduct, are logically unassailable, even though 
the proper place to  put them be, as Schopenhauer said, the 
madhouse.” 
But we have just seen that on the pluralistic theory reality 
consists exclusively of particulars. What ,  then, can be the 
meaning of introducing the qualifying phrase “so f a r”?  I t  
is necessary in order to  escape from solipsism, and, in other 
words, to enable the several persons to  communicate with 
one another-communication consisting “in establishing 
relations between these primary realia.” There  must be a 
medium for mutual understanding, and by means of it they 
must arrive a t  common knowledge. 
But what can “common knowledge” mean for the plural- 
ist? Evidently not that the knowledge which L has is also 
possessed by M and N. They “cannot change places so that 
the presentations of one become accessible in their actual 
entirety to  the others.” “This is just the most impossible 
thing in the world. Individuality consists precisely in this 
impossibility.” T h e  knowledge of L, M and N may con- 
ceivably agree, but no part  o r  element of the knowledge of L 
can be the knowledge of M o r  N. Each of them “mirrors 
the universe from a unique standpoint of his own.” Every 
Ego has its own non-Ego. “Thus, when in place of the E g o  
L we have M or N, so too in place of the non-Ego non-L 
we have non-M or  non-N.” T h e  mutual independence and 
isolation of the subjects of knowledge thus carries with it the 
isolation and mutual exclusion of the objects of their know- 
ledge. All experience, to  begin with, is, we are told, “in- 
dividual.” I t  is the private knowledge of each person, and 
it is a knowledge of different objects. When ten men look a t  
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the sun or  moon, “each of these persons sees a different 
object.” How, then, and in what sense do the ten come to 
know that the actual object of each is the same individual 
object for all? H o w  can they hold any communication 
with one another so as to  agree, o r  even disagree? “Except 
on the basis of individual experience, communication is im- 
possible,” for  it is evident that, first of all, each must have 
something which he wishes to communicate. The  difficulty 
would seem to be insuperable. 
I t  is overcome, however, by one author in a very simple 
way. H e  assumes just the least possible “common know- 
ledge” ! “The most that L can indicate or  communicate to 
M of any part  of his own experience is so much of it as is 
common to the experience of both.” W e  may be sure that 
the earliest intercourse is very slight : just simple indications, 
a mere pointing to a particular thing as this or  that. But 
once it is begun, the process goes on successfully. “We  point 
to other particulars resembling it, other shining, moving, 
round objects, and so, by suggesting its likeness to  these, take 
the chance that parallel relations or  comparisons will be 
verified by our fellow-men.” 
Criticism of this view seems to me to  be superfluous. It is 
directly self-contradictory ; and the contradiction is not in the 
least removed by admitting as little common knowledge to 
begin with as possible. Fo r  “common knowledge” or  “com- 
mon” anything is just what pluralism denies. 
N o r  does practice come to the help of theory, as we are 
asked to  believe. I do not doubt in the least that “the case of 
ten hungry men and a loaf would be an impressive object-les- 
son”; and it ought to  be specially impressive to the pluralist. 
Fo r  he would find it difficult to  live up to  his theory were he 
one of the ten. T o  do so, having his own unique experience 
of his own unique loaf, he should not object t o  any of the 
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others eating their own unique loaves-supposing, indeed, 
he could be aware of their loaves. A pluralism that is con- 
sistent is certainly not supported by practical experience, and 
there is absolutely no transition possible from individual 
experience, such as it is represented by the pluralist, to  that  
experience which is universal in the sense that different men 
understand one another and mean the same things by the 
same things. 
I t  would be interesting to observe the manner in which the 
pluralist repeats, in his final philosophical account of reality 
as a whole, the same contradictory process as he employs in 
order to  enable his theory to start on its way. Fo r  we find 
that the deity is introduced as a background of unity, or as 
some kind of substrate, o r  is even spoken of as “immanent.” 
I t  is admitted, however, that such a conception of the unity 
of the whole cannot be “empirically verified.” “The plural- 
ist halts at the Many and their interaction; he declines to go 
further because he finds no warrant fo r  so doing.” But if it 
is objected that the hypothesis of unity is of no use unless it 
can be verified, we are reminded that philosophy is not sci- 
ence. Science must verify empirically. The  facts with 
which science deals “fall within experience, and this is sure, 
therefore, sooner o r  later to  furnish a crucial test of the 
validity” (of its hypotheses). But philosophy cannot justify 
its ideas in this way. It employs another method. It jus- 
tifies its “ideas” by appealing to  “experience as a concrete 
whole”; “and they are justified in proportion as they enable 
us to  conceive this whole as a complete and systematic unity.” 
But, we ask, is not the conception of the whole as “a complete 
and systematic unity” precisely what the pluralist cannot 
have? For ,  as we are  told in the next sentence, “the plural- 
ist halts a t  the Many and their interaction; he declines to  go 
further because he finds no direct warrant for  doing so.” 
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H e  gets his indirect warrant by an appeal to theism-that is, 
by an appeal to that which cannot be included in his theory 
because it contradicts it. T h e  pluralist, being also a theist, 
admits a unity for  which he has no warrant in experience, 
and with which the facts which are held to  be given in ex- 
perience, being a “Many,” are directly inconsistent. Plural- 
ism begins and ends with a contradiction. 
T h e  failure of pluralism in its application to  the objects of 
knowledge is not less evident than it is in its application to  
the subjects of knowledge. T h e  relation of the former to  
one another is as unintelligible and impossible as intercom- 
munication between the latter. In fact, the problem in both 
cases is the same ; for all objects of knowledge turn out to  be 
in the last resort all subjects of knowledge, and all “things” 
are held to  be persons. “The  only things of which we have 
positive knowledge are subjects with intrinsic qualities, 
things that are something in themselves and something for 
themselves.” 
T h e  pluralist admits relations between objects, as he ad- 
mits the intercommunication of subjects and an experience 
which is universal. But they are not relations between 
things, in the sense of existing over and above that which 
they relate. There  are not things here and relations there ; 
in other words, there are no existential universals. 
What ,  then, are relations? They  are the activities of par- 
ticulars, “the intercourse, the cooperation o r  conflict, actual 
or possible, of the individuals themselves.” “The  passion 
and action of things must take the place of relation. . . . 
There  are no objective relations other than this living action 
and passion.” But we know nothing that is active o r  passive 
except minds, and nothing else can be for itself. Hence “the 
only cuuses of which we have positive knowledge are minds : 
these have a nature of their own, and hence can interact, 
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determine and be determined.” Pluralism ends in pan- 
psychism. “The attractions and repulsions of which the 
physicist speaks only metaphorically, are to  be taken literally 
-that is, as implying impulses initiated and determined by 
feeling.” “For  modern pluralism the universe is the totality 
of monads really interacting.” T h e  “Many of pluralism 
constitutes the class of entelechies o r  persons in the widest 
sense-beings, that is to say, who are something for  them- 
selves, conative and cognitive individuals bent on self-conser- 
vation and seeking the good.” “They are severally related 
by their mutual interaction. . . . W e  have not two distinct 
and separable facts-first, the Many, existing in isolation, 
and then their interaction.” “The  universe is the totality of 
monads really interacting, and this is one fact.” “The  plu- 
rality implies the unity, and this unity implies the plurality- 
a fact which is an inexhaustible wonder.” 
Now it is evident that the crucial question for this doctrine 
is the possibility of the interaction of the monads, o r  the cog- 
nitive and conative persons into which all reality, including 
so-called material reality, has been resolved. But we have 
found already that this is impossible, and I shall add only 
one consideration to those I have already advanced. 
Let it be assumed that the monad o r  personality A knows 
and wills, and also that for it to be is to  know and will. Let 
it be admitted, further, that monads B, C and D do and are 
the same. I t  is plain that the action and passion of A are 
exclusively its own: so also are the actions of B, C and D. Is  
it less plain that in that case the relation or  interaction of 
these several experiences, supposing it does result, is no part  
of the action o r  passion of any one of them? T h e  assump- 
tion that the actions and passions do interact, and that they 
are experienced as interacting, may be quite true: but for 
the pluralist it must not only be made gratuitously and dog- 
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matically, but in flat contradiction of the fundamental 
hypothesis of the particularity and exclusive individuality of 
every item of the “Many.” 
Moreover, I must ask one more question of the pluralist. 
Can any particle, monad, person o r  subject either be active 
o r  passive purely from within itself? T h e  pluralist finds 
his clue to  the nature of all reality in his own mind. H a s  he 
known his own mind, either mind o r  will, entirely apart  from 
the universe in which it exists? I s  action or  passion in YUCUO 
possible? And is not a mind out of all relation to  the world, 
a self which has no not-self, a vacuum and pure fiction? T o  
will, think, o r  even feel nothing is neither to think nor will 
nor feel; and a mind without any “content” is a nonentity. 
On  the other hand, if it has a content, that content, for  all 
the purposes of “conation and cognition,” is an object and a 
non-Ego. But an E g o  which has its non-Ego or  world as its 
content o r  object of experience is not the “particular,” exclu- 
sive Ego  of the pluralist. I t  a t  least implicitly contains its 
world! T h e  Ego, instead of being exclusive and particular, 
turns out to be at least potentially all-comprehensive. T h e  
individual mind is the subjective expression and the spiritual 
focus of the universe. It is a Many in One;  and to explain 
how this can be is the paramount problem of philosophy. 
I t  is an old problem, this of the relation of the One and 
the Many;  and I agree entirely with Dr. W a r d  when he says 
that “the solution is not to be obtained by passing over the 
Many at  the outset, trusting to  deduce them afterward from 
an absolute One that is reached a priori”; and that “this 
method has proved itself illusory; the seeming attainment of 
the One has meant the disappearance of the Many.” If, as 
he avers, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer, and others 
less distinguished verily held such an “absolutism or  singu- 
larism,”-a question which I do not raise a t  present,-their 
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recent thought does well in recoiling from their doctrines. I 
can only say that I have not understood them in this and that 
way. On the other hand, I find that Dr .  W a r d  admits that 
pluralism has also “failed to reach a satisfactory solution of 
the problem of the One and the Many”;  he allows “that no 
philosophy has ever managed to reconcile these two notions 
of an infinite power and an infinite variety of limited, indi- 
vidualized expressions of that power.” But I would apply 
to pluralism, mutatis mutandis, precisely what he says of 
absolutism o r  singularism. T h e  solution is not to be 
obtained by passing over the [One] [Many] at the outset, 
trusting to deduce [it] afterward from the Absolute 
[Many]. F o r  the Many is not “given.” T h e  pure Many 
is as much an a priori construct as the “Absolute One,” and 
as little given in experience. And as it is admitted that 
“Pluralism fails o r  has so f a r  failed to account for the unity 
that it in fact involves,” then the right and the duty of recoil- 
ing from the doctrine is as absolute and imperative as the 
right and duty of recoiling from its opposite. 
Indeed, the promise as well as the problem of the philo- 
sophic thought of the twentieth century arises from the ex- 
posure of the impossibility of both of these abstract theories, 
and its rejection all along the line, from the most elementary 
perception to the most comprehensive reflective knowledge 
of the premises and the methods of both. 
LECTURE I11 
0 theory can be satisfactory i f  it is inconsistent with N itself; and none can be satisfactory if it attains self- 
consistency by merely ignoring o r  abolishing differences. 
Pluralism cannot afford to be self-contradictory, and sin- 
gularism o r  absolutism cannot afford to affirm empty same- 
ness. These rival schools, starting from opposite poles and 
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employing opposite methods, would arrive at the same goal. 
They would admit in their scheme both unity and diversity, 
and they would reconcile these notions. And reconciliation 
would, for  both alike, mean more than the admission of unity 
and diversity side by side. T h e  One must be explicable only 
through the Many, and the Many only through the One. 
Such is the acknowledged condition and criterion of philo- 
sophic truth : it cannot contain ultimate incongruities nor be 
incomplete; it must be a system which is all-comprehensive, 
and in which all the elements have their own place and 
function. 
I t  ought, it seems to  me, to  be obvious that the condition 
and criterion of reality must in these respects be the same for  
the real. To maintain a different criterion of truth and real- 
ity is not possible with establishing a fundamental discrep- 
ancy between them at  all points. Reality can as well contain 
ultimate contingencies as truth can contain ultimate contra- 
dictions. Pluralism must as a philosophical theory be a 
doctrine of the universe as a whole, and if its doctrine must 
be self-consistent its universe must be one. And absolutism, 
i f  its “One” is to  have meaning, must affirm the real diversity 
of the real. In  a word, on any theory, the destiny of reality 
must be the same as that of truth. Epistemology and ontol- 
ogy, even for  those who recoil from saying that “reality is 
experience,” must be two names for one doctrine. For  the 
real gains no expression except in knowledge, and knowledge 
must have the real for  its content. 
No one will affirm that the concrete truth of the concrete 
real either has been o r  can be attained by human knowledge. 
In  that sense no philosophy has ever pretended to be “abso- 
lute.” But we found in the last lecture that such a truth 
cannot be approached, and that not even the first step can 
be taken toward it by a philosophy which omits either the 
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One o r  the Many from its original premises. There  is no 
way either from differences to unity o r  from unity to  differ- 
ence. Indeed, it might be shown that both pure difference 
and pure unity are confused and contradictory notions. To 
endeavor to  start from either the one o r  the other is to  start 
from the abstract and the meaningless. 
W h a t  alternative remains for philosophy? Evidently to  
start from unity as expressing itself in diversity, o r  as al- 
ready concrete. Knowledge must exhibit a t  every stage- 
even the first- the essential characteristics of a system. 
Every object, whether it be that of immediate perception o r  
that of philosophic reflection, whether it be a so-called 
simple fact o r  the universe in its totality, must have the char- 
acter of individuality. This means that it must consist of 
parts o r  elements between which there are real differences; 
but, at the same time, the differences must so complement 
and sustain one another as to  constitute one reality. And 
that reality is not the mere sum of the parts o r  elements, nor 
is it anything superimposed upon them by way of a contain- 
ing supplement o r  envelope. For the one can neither be 
indifferent to  the elements nor independent of them; nor are 
they, on their part, indifferent to o r  independent of one 
another o r  of the whole. T h e  One and the Many must 
derive their intrinsic character and their very being and 
function from each other. They  must be distinguishable, fo r  
they are different; but they must not be separable, for they 
constitute a unity. On the other hand, they must be One, for 
they are forms of one reality; but they must not be fused 
into sameness, for  they are different. But this means that 
individuality belongs both to  the whole and also to every real 
element of the whole o r  instance of the Many. T o  deny the 
individuality of the whole is to  disintegrate it into inex- 
plicable and unreal differences, every one of which “is a surd 
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for thought”; and to  deny the individuality of the parts or 
elements is to  reduce unity to  emptiness and to  make it mean- 
ingless. Hence, further, the One and the Many must be 
both dependent upon and independent of each other. They 
must exist in themselves, and nevertheless exist only in virtue 
of their relation to  each other in a whole which is at once 
constituted by them and constitutive of them. 
But, it may well be asked, does this not also imply that 
philosophy starts from and deals with a self-contradiction ? 
I t  depends, I shall try to  show, on the meaning of “individu- 
ality,” of dependence and independence, of real being and of 
relation. In all cases it is the  problem of philosophy to 
explain this apparent enigma. I t  is not to  show that this 
view of the individuality and reality of the whole and of all 
its elements is true. W e  have seen that philosophy postu- 
lates this view of truth and reality in attempting to be a 
coherent o r  systematic doctrine. N o r  is the postulate a mere 
a priori assumption, unsustained by experience. On the 
contrary, there is no department of experience which does 
not contain, o r  rather consist of, instances of the unity of the 
diverse, and of the diversity o r  complexity of the One. T h e  
problem confronts ordinary thought on every side, only it 
ignores it, and it is presented in every one of the arts and 
sciences. Let me exemplify this fact by citing one o r  two 
examples. When four voices sing together the notes 
C E G C’, o r  G C D, o r  D F A, harmony ensues. Now har- 
mony is not mere unison, nor is it mere multiplicity. I t  is a 
single effect in which all the voices are fused into unity, but 
the fusion does not annul the differences nor destroy the in- 
dividuality of the voice. T h e  individual harmony consists 
of individual voices each of which is enriched by its relations 
and intensified in its beauty. 
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It is evident that the same holds of a piece of music as a 
whole. I t  consists of sequent movements, the first of which 
passes away to  make room for  its successor, and yet the char- 
acter of the movements which come last depends upon-that 
is, somehow carries within-what went before, and con- 
tinuity-nay, unity-remains by meam of the succession. 
Every work of a r t  exhibits the same character of being a 
One in value of the Many, and presents the same problem. 
A turret depends for  its artistic value upon the place it occu- 
pies in the edifice; and so does the artistic value of the 
edifice. Each gives and borrows its significance and worth 
from the other, and yet each has its own meaning. So it is 
also with a picture or  a poem. Both the parts and the whole 
have their individual being and value, and yet these depend 
on their relation to one another in the whole. 
When we turn from the arts to  the sciences and to philos- 
ophy-to systematized knowledge-the same truth holds. 
T h e  meaning of a statement depends upon its context and all 
its cognitive value. A statement may be rendered meaning 
less by changing its context; and truth itself becomes error 
when it is placed out of “the appropriate universe of dis- 
course.” 
Nevertheless the unity of the systematic truth is not 
obtained by mere fusion. Every element in it retains its own 
value, and makes its own contribution to  the whole. When 
the mathematician, fo r  instance, proves a theorem in geom- 
etry he is engaged in demonstrating one, and only one, truth : 
e.g., that the angles of a triangle are together equal to two 
right angles. But the single proof of a single truth somehow 
consists of many truths, and these are a t  once independent 
and interdependent. They  are independent in that they can- 
not be done without, and nothing can replace them o r  per- 
form their function in the proof;  they are interdependent in 
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so f a r  as none of them has either significance or value except 
by reference to  one another and to the single truth they sub- 
serve. 
In  short, the testimony of rational experience to  the real- 
ity and the interdependence, to  the individuality and to  the 
essential and even constitutive interrelation of the Many and 
the One, is universal. T h e  mere Many of the pluralist and 
the mere One of the absolutist are alike nothing more nor 
less than fictions. Experience gives no example of them. 
They  are the results of the abstract treatment of experience. 
I t  follows, therefore, that the interpretation of experi- 
ence, which philosophy is, must accept this apparent enigma. 
Its  problem is not to  show whether, but how, this can be pos- 
sible-to maintain the reality both of the One and the Many, 
and to reconcile in its theory what is already reconciled in 
reality. 
But to maintain this view of philosophy, and to carry it 
out into its results, is to challenge a formidable array of 
abstractions. For, as we have already seen, the tissue of 
reality is torn by human knowledge and its seamless raiment 
rent asunder. W e  convert differences into contradictions, 
and isolate and fix our distinctions ; and, in consequence, we 
find the differences irreconcilable. T h e  reality and indepen- 
dence of the Many is assumed to imply that they are exclu- 
sive ; and any degree of community of existence is held, as a 
matter of course, to  destroy their individuality. T h e  sway 
of abstractions is very wide. 
Nevertheless I believe, as I have said, that if there be any 
movement of thought in this twentieth century which spe- 
cially characterizes its mission and promises significant re- 
sults, it is that of first exposing and then rejecting these 
abstract opposites. I t  is, in one word, to repudiate the 
categories-what Kant by a new abstraction called the Cate- 
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gories of the Understanding, which are the categories of ex- 
ternal and of both contingent and necessary relation. I t  is 
to  reject in toto the view that the reality o r  individuality of 
anything can consist in o r  depend upon its isolation. I t  is to  
discover that to negate is not to  contradict, and that to  affirm 
is not to  reduce into mere sameness. On  the other hand, it 
is not to  say that reality consists of relations; but it is t o  say 
that it is not independent of relations, and that i f  relations 
are abolished nothing whatsoever remains. I t  is to hold 
steadfast to  the truth so plainly illustrated in every work of 
art, which consists at all times of  individual parts every one 
of which has its own character and function, and which nev- 
ertheless is dependent for  both its character and its function 
upon the work of ar t  as a whole. For,  whether we can ex- 
plain it o r  not, a piece of music does consist of individual 
notes, and not of mere relations ; and yet i f  the relations be- 
tween the several notes be annulled they are changed, and no 
music remains. And whether we can explain it o r  not, every 
rational judgment, true or false, makes one affirmation, and 
that affirmation contains a diversity of elements. 
But i f  this be the special mission of the philosophy of the 
twentieth century, it must be admitted that the promise of its 
fulfilment is, so far ,  faint. Its exposure of the necessary 
failure of the one-sided assumptions of both pluralism and 
abstract absolutism is incomplete. It has not taken to  heart 
that experience furnishes no example of either mere unity or 
mere diversity, and that these rival theories have pure fic- 
tions for  their premises. Hence it has not repudiated either 
the method o r  the aim of these abstract doctrines. I t  is con- 
tinuing the attempt to  bring the One and the Many together, 
instead of  proceeding from the presupposition that they al- 
ways are together. I ts  process is either synthetic or ana- 
lytic; synthetic in so far  as it seeks to proceed from the mere 
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Many;  analytic in so f a r  as it seeks to proceed from the mere 
One. It does not begin with the conception of system, of 
reality as a concrete element, nor proceed to observe its 
growth or  evolution, by which unity becomes more deep and 
significant and the diversity of the parts more clear. 
Let me illustrate this truth in the first place with regard 
to knowledge. T h e  subject of knowledge-namely, the 
finite, rational self-is still regarded as a res completa; and 
the object which the subject seeks to know is regarded as 
another res completa. T h e  problem of knowledge, there- 
fore, assumes the form of showing how they can be brought 
together. And, further, it is assumed, though with a confi- 
dence sharply shaken, that the way of bringing them together 
is to  resolve the one into the other, or, in other words, to 
abolish the difference between them. And i f  we have de- 
spaired of resolving the subject into its object by the way of 
materialism, we have, on the other hand, not repudiated the 
opposite method of resolving the world into the subjective 
experience of one o r  more subjects. Subjective idealism is 
still in vogue, for we say that reality is experience, and in 
panpsychism the monadism of Leibnitz is being resuscitated, 
so that all reality is made to consist of what one may call 
spiritual points, which have only intensive magnitude and no 
“body” except their own activities. 
I t  is true that philosophers now speak of subject-object, 
and will even admit that spirit and nature are somehow cor- 
relates; but only the most limited use is made of the concep- 
tion. And when it is affirmed that reality is experience, 
experience” is allowed to remain utterly ambiguous so as to  
carry either an objective or a subjective reference at  will. 
O r  when it is explained, as for instance by M r .  Bradley, ex- 
perience, and therefore reality, is said to consist of feelings, 
thought and volitions, and subjective idealism reappears. 
I L  
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Tha t  little use is made of the conception subject-object 
beyond the admission that reality is somehow spiritual, is evi- 
dent f rom the fact that the psychologist, and also the episte- 
mologist, not only distinguish but separate the functions of 
mind and things. T h e  world of reality presents the data for 
mind, and mind then makes the knowledge. But the world 
cannot give until the mind takes, and the mind cannot take 
until the world gives; and there is no priority of any kind, 
either temporal o r  logical. T h e  statement that  reality is 
experience is meant to convey their intrinsic correlation. But 
the statement is allowed to  remain vague; and experience is, 
after all, made to belong exclusively to  the subject. I t  is his 
living conation and cognition, and the object world is its 
product ; and the idealism which practically all philosophers 
now profess becomes a doctrine which reduces reality either 
into phenomena of consciousness, such as thoughts, feelings 
and volitions, o r  into spiritual monads, more o r  less confused 
personalities. 
But consciousness cannot be active-that is to say, it can- 
not be consciousness-except in relation to  objects, and the 
datu of knowledge cannot be the results of knowing. Hence 
the function of the real in the act of knowing must be re- 
stored, and consciousness, with all its activities, must be its 
activity as consciousness, and as a consciousness which is in- 
dividual. W e  must make room for  the function of both 
mind and the world in knowledge, and maintain that, as sep- 
arate, they can neither do nor be anything. Knowledge 
proceeds neither from minds nor from objects. I t  is the self- 
revelation of the whole which comprises both, and is both in 
their interaction. However true it may be that experience is 
subjective, personal, private to  every individual finite spirit, it 
is still a consciousness which has contents, which exists only 
by reference to  it, and which cannot make it. T o  account 
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for  knowledge we must assume a reality which is wider than 
either subjects o r  objects, because it comprehends both, and 
neither is except in relation to its opposite. T o  begin with, 
either is comparable to  the process of a mathematician who 
looks for a product by beginning with one of the factors, 
starting from either 6 or 7 in order to  arrive at 42. Know- 
ledge is the result of the interaction of the two aspects of 
reality which we not only distinguish but separate and then 
strive to  bring together. W e  endeavor to  find a way out of 
consciousness and into a relation with facts, whereas we are 
a t  all, and are conscious, only in virtue of our relation to the 
reality which comprehends both our minds and the facts. 
But i f  this is true we shall cease to  speak of the self and 
the not-self, of subjects and objects, of mind and matter, of 
soul and body, of spirit and nature, of God and man as first 
existing apart, and then brought together through the inter- 
action which reveals itself in knowledge, in the fine arts, in 
morality and in religion ; for that interaction is, as we have 
seen, impossible unless they are together. Our distinctions 
must remain and the differences must be real, and the indi- 
viduality and even the personal privacy of the human spirit 
be maintained, but they must be maintained within the unity 
of the real which comprises both the opposites. 
T h a t  the thought of the present day is making toward this 
genuine universal standpoint is not to be doubted. There  is 
evidence of it especially in such doctrines as that of the 
l (  natural-supernaturalism of Carlyle,” in the spiritual real- 
ism of Goethe, of Wordsworth; in the indefinite view of 
the immanence o r  indwelling of the divine in nature; in the 
repudiation of materialism by natural science and its clearing 
consciousness of the abstract character of its hypotheses and 
task; in the growing conviction of the intrinsic interaction of 
man and society; in the growing suspicion of both individu- 
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alistic and socialistic theories, and in the thinning down of 
the partition between the secular and the sacred, so that man 
finds his duty, which is his spiritual opportunity and privi- 
lege, in every station, and believes that every service of man 
may be the service of God. T h e  sense of man’s affinity with 
the universe is deepening in every way, and the universe it- 
self seems to acquire a spiritual significance because man is 
an element in it. 
T h e  justification of this new attitude which philosophy 
must furnish is difficult. But psychology on the one side, and 
logic on the other, are preparing the way for the new meta- 
physic. T h e  former finds no evidence that mind, however 
spontaneous, can create its own content. Even imagination, 
when it is more free, only selects and rearranges. If it 
creates its heaven as it pleases, it must borrow its material, 
as Hume has shown, from the present world, making its 
streets of gold and gates of pearl, etc. All knowledge is 
both relative and anthropomorphic, just because both man 
and his world are necessary factors in the function of know- 
ing. If man is and must be spontaneous in his cognitive and 
conative activities, it is not because he is separate from the 
world. In isolation he is helpless. As he cannot lift a hand 
o r  move a foot except by means of the resistance which is 
also the help of the physical cosmos, so he can neither know 
nor will, and is in fact only a name o r  nothingness in his iso- 
lation. T h e  world is not a hindrance to  man’s “spontaneous” 
spiritual activities, but their indispensable condition. In 
truth, his knowledge is the activity of the real in and by him; 
but it is his knowledge none the less, for by it he comprises 
the real. 
On the other hand, his affinity to and dependence upon his 
cosmos is also its dependence upon him. T h e  cosmos of the 
materialist is as inconceivable as the knowing subject or de- 
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tached self of the abstract idealist. If mind is not except in 
its relation to the object, neither is the object except in rela- 
tion to the subject. T h e  dependence is interdependence, and 
the real is never only one of its aspects. I t  is neither natural 
nor spiritual i f  these are considered apart. 
N o r  does the dependence of the world of objects on mind 
mean that mind, as we know it, makes them, and in making 
them infects them with its own subjectivity. T h e  objects do 
not turn out on examination to be nothing but experience, if 
by experience is meant-as it ought to mean-thoughts, feel- 
ings and volitions, which somehow become substantiated into 
these ambiguous realities, hovering between being and non- 
being, which we call phenomena. There is no such thing as 
a “world of truth” which stands over against things in them- 
selves, and mediates between them and minds, being, as 
Lotze called them, “a replica” of the real. T h e  problem of 
discovering the connection between ideas and their objects, 
and all the attempted solutions of the problem by making the 
former images or symbols or  representatives of the latter, 
or  the latter reifications of the former, are as unmeaning 
and futile as the problem of the relation of the world of 
fairies to the world of every-day life. There  are minds and 
there are things, and because they are elements of one reality 
they interact. During their interaction there is knowing, 
and the result of the activity of knowing is to  modify the 
subject which knows so that it can repeat the process, even 
when the objects which first contributed to  it are  not present. 
But there is no such result as a concatenated system of ideas, 
nor even a single idea that has any permanence o r  being of 
its own. T h e  relation of minds and of things is direct in the 
last resort, and the relation between them is constitutive of 
both. 
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But this, it will be said, makes reality depend for  its exis- 
tence upon being known, and at the least derive a new stage 
of existence and a higher manifestation of itself from and 
through man’s mind. In  that case must not the act of know- 
ing defeat itself? It is the object of knowing to  apprehend 
facts as they a re ;  but that is surely not possible if the act of 
knowing changes them. Knowing them changes them, I 
should answer, and defeats thereby its own purpose, only i f  
we continue to assume the dualistic point of view which, a t  
present, we are  endeavoring to repudiate, and continue to  
treat them as separate existences brought together. But the 
difficulty does not arise if knowing is neither the function of 
mind nor of objects as apart, but of the reality which com- 
prises them both as elements and aspects. From this latter 
point of view reality may be shown to enrich itself, to  allow 
fuller being, to  set free and to  realize new potentialities 
through the cognitive activities we have been attributing to 
the self, but which belong to it as comprising the self. 
An illustration may indicate the possibility of the truth of 
the view I am trying to  express. 
T h e  physicist is supposed to give an account of sound. H e  
tells us that it is wave movement. But the least analysis will 
show that he professes no such thing. H e  explains only one 
of the conditions of sound. Apart  from the psychological 
structure of the human organism, and also apart  from the 
presumably non-physical but psychological structure of his 
consciousness, there is no sound. Delete any one of these three 
distinguishable elements-the physical, physiological, o r  
psychical-there would be no sound and the universe would 
be silent. Sound is not analyzable into any one of these factors, 
nor attributed to  any one of them rather than to  the others ; 
and when all the elements of a unity are  necessary there is a 
true sense in which it is not possible to give priority to  any 
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one of them. On the other hand, it is true that the physical 
conditions of sound-the wave movements produced by the 
pressing down of the keys of the organ and the filling of the 
pipes with wind-gain new significance and value when the 
organ is played by a great artist and the physical conditions 
are subordinated to the musical purposes of a great com- 
poser. T h e  coming in upon the scene of the musician’s soul 
reveals a new range of meaning and beauty which before 
were dormant in the physical structure of the natural world; 
and reality as a whole, which has produced and contributed 
to the instruction and which comprises the musician, assumes 
through him a new way of being. And yet, though without 
him there can be no music, we cannot attribute the musical 
effect to  him alone, as we do  knowledge, an experience, to the 
activities of the subject. Without his context he also is help- 
less. T h e  distinction of meum and tuucm does not hold. T h e  
musician’s spontaneous-or, as we say, creative-power is 
conditioned by the real world as a whole in which he lives 
and moves and has his being, and at the same time the real 
world needs him in order to realize the significance even of 
its natural elements. 
This illustration suggests the possibility of maintaining 
that finite minds by their cognitive and conative activities 
have a more significant function in relation to  the world of 
reality than that of “manifesting” o r  “expressing” its mean- 
ing in the way of truth:  and that their relation to  it is more 
intimate than can be accounted for by any theory which at- 
tributes their activities to themselves alone, and which makes 
consciousness contain an idle, epistemological replica of real- 
ity. If in order that there may be music, o r  any other of the 
productions of fine art, reality as a whole comprising the 
artist must be effectively present, so reality as a whole must 
be that which thinks and wills. Not  that minds in willing 
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and knowing are mere instruments upon which the world of 
reality plays, o r  by which it gains better and fuller expres- 
sion. T h e  idea of “instrument” is inadequate to  the occa- 
sion, and we obscure the truth and lapse back into dualism 
when we represent minds as operated  upon.  I t  is the mind 
which introduces the purpose. In the case of both the mu- 
sician and the scientific man or philosopher the natural ele- 
ments of the cosmos are in a sense subordinated to  their 
purpose; and yet the purpose is not alien to the natural cos- 
mos, or superimposed upon it from without. F o r  nature’s 
own potencies are realized in and by them, and in him they 
acquire themselves a better and fuller way of existence. 
But in that case we must start from a new hypothesis as to 
the nature of reality. W e  must no longer speak of it as 
either natural or spiritual, nor, in order to  account for it, 
endeavor to  make the natural disappear in the spiritual. 
Nature as merely natural is now discovered to be only a 
fragment of reality, even of reality as finite minds know it. 
I t  is and remains “natural,” for it is the condition of the 
spiritual activities, which condition is fulfilled in the finite 
minds into which it breaks. T h e  facts which we speak of as 
given in actual experience are real as manifesting themselves 
in finite minds. Reality has this dual character. I t  functions 
in the thinking and volition of men as truly as in the form 
and the color of plants. Reality has a dual character, o r  
rather it is natural-spiritual. W e  may distinguish but we 
cannot separate its elements. Hence mind and reality do  not 
need to  be brought together, and thought has not the impos- 
sible task before it of going out of itself to reality. I t  is by 
comprising the real: and the real exhibits its full and true 
nature only in the activities by which truth and goodness are 
attained. When mind appears on the scene the real breaks 
into knowledge as well as into music, and into moral lives as 
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well as statutes and stately edifices. I t  remains natural, but 
it is a nature with spiritual potencies that break out into 
actuality in man. H e  is nothing apart  from it. H e  is con- 
tinuous with it. H e  is effective as mind and will in the de- 
gree in which as subject he is saturated with its truth and 
purpose. Fo r  his purpose is a revelation and liberation of 
Nature’s purpose. H e  is no external addendum, but her 
product. But when he appears, being her highest product, 
he recoils upon her, sublates her lower forms of being, as- 
similates them with and incorporates them into activities 
which are his activities without ceasing to  be Nature’s own. 
There  is a psychological problem for  which, so far ,  no 
solution has been found. I t  is that of the relation of soul 
and body. Psychologists at present propose one of two 
theories. They  suggest a panpsychism which converts all 
bodies into souls, o r  a parallelism between them and their 
phenomena. T h e  former theory introduces more difficulties 
than it solves, and, so far ,  has not shown itself worthy of 
serious discussion; the latter confesses its failure in that it 
only states the problem and, in fact, offers no solution of it. 
If our criticisms have any validity, no solution of this prob- 
lem is possible; and it is impossible because it contains a surd. 
I t  is like the problem of proving that 2 x 2 = 91, which 
would baffle all mathematicians ; o r  of inventing a perpetually 
moving machine, which must baffle the physical inventor; o r  
like saying, “Why should we be moral?”, which must baffle 
the moralist. T h e  mathematician, physicist and moralist 
who know what they are  about will not ask these questions. 
N o r  will the psychologist endeavor to relate-that is, to 
bring together in thought-what he assumes to  be separate 
in existence. H e  will rather take to heart what Aristotle 
has said of such a dualism. H e  will regard the soul as the 
highest expression, the full reality, the i v h p y e ~ a  of the body 
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-not deleting it, nor supplanting it, nor yet subordinated to  
it as a mere consequence o r  effect, but rather as that  in which 
the body exhibits and realizes its full being, and in doing so 
proves its intrinsic spiritual potentialities. In  man also we 
find exemplified always, not a soul plus a body, not merely 
natural o r  physical and superadded spiritual powers, but one 
being whose spiritual activities are at once conditioned by, 
and sublate, o r  take up, the so-called natural elements. T h e  
problem of the psychologist as a t  present stated is insoluble, 
because he is unjust to  his body and ignores its function in all 
volition and thought, attributing cognition and volition to  a 
mind in isolation, mind as merely subjective, of the existence 
of which there is no least item of evidence in any experience. 
Man,  like the cosmos, is nature a t  its highest and best, 
and nature is not a dead mechanism and mere opposite of 
spirit, any more than it is spiritual apart  from mind. T h e  
beauty and truth and goodness which appear when man is 
upon the scene are not only his, but nature’s also. And 
spirit does not dwell in it as in a dead husk, but is its own 
intrinsic power. This, it seems to me, is the view toward 
which recent thought is gradually moving. I t  is the theme 
and the inspiration of the greatest poetry of our time, from 
Goethe and Wordsworth to  Robert Browning, and it is the 
aspiration of the highest morality and of the most elevated 
and reflective religious consciousness of the present age. I t  
is the special mission of philosophy to  demonstrate the valid- 
ity of this view, and make good the truth of the one radiant 
ideal. 
There  are evidences that philosophy has entered upon this 
task. But the task is great and very difficult. I t  implies not 
merely revulsion from the consequences of the abstractions 
which have hitherto obstructed its path, but the most fun- 
damental revolution of all the revolutions of the world of 
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mind. I t  implies a change of method. I t  must start from 
a different hypothesis and must therefore reinterpret every 
fact in the light of this hypothesis. I must content myself at 
present by merely indicating the main obstacles which 
obstruct its path as it enters upon its problem, all of them 
due to  the abstractions which we have substantiated into 
contradictory opposites. 
T h e  first of these are logical, and therefore metaphysical 
also, o r  ontological. I acknowledge that it is precisely in its 
logical doctrine that modern philosophy has made its great- 
est advance toward the adoption of this point of view, which, 
in fact, is that of spiritual realism or concrete absolutism. 
Nevertheless, even a t  its best, it is not free from the en- 
tanglements which issue from the use of the external cate- 
gories, which Kant called the Categories of the Understand- 
ing. T h a t  it is not content with their use and that it aspires 
to a better is illustrated by its appeal to intuition. Intuition 
is found to  achieve what lies beyond the power of the under- 
standing. I t  grasps things in their veritable unity: it does 
not obliterate differences, but it makes them harmonious o r  
transparent-to employ its metaphors. I t  bridges the gulf 
between knowledge and reality, and brings mind into imme- 
diate illuminating contact with that which is. But it does this 
at the expense of all method. Its operations are mystical 
and miraculous. I t  explains by means of the unintelligible. 
I t  has no value except in so far as it expresses discontent 
with the external methods of “the mere understanding,” 
which, after all, it cannot supplant and must merely supple- 
ment. 
I t  is like the 
optimism which finds that all is right with the world by 
denying o r  ignoring its unhappiness and wickedness. I t  can- 
not help until it turns back upon the topics of the understand- 
T h e  method of intuitionism is too easy. 
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ing, and reveals the unity within its opposites, and shows it 
to  be intuitive in the double sense that it always grasps unity 
and is always in actual touch with the real. But owing to  
the domination of these external categories the judgment is 
still treated as if it were the result either of a purely analytic 
or of a purely synthetic process, and reasoning as if it were 
either deductive or inductive. T h e  predicate is either at- 
tached to the subject as a new thing, o r  it is a mere repeti- 
tion of a part  of the subject. In  the first case the judg- 
ment is a mere accretion of elements; in the second, a mere 
tautology. In the first case it cannot be true; in the sec- 
ond it can have no meaning. Moreover, both of these 
processes rest upon a false supposition as to the nature of 
the relation of the part of the judgment, as well as of the 
parts themselves. Thei r  agreement is assumed to  mean 
their identical and indistinguishable sameness-bare unity ; 
their disagreement or negation, to be contradiction and repul- 
sion. In no way, therefore, can either of these theories 
represent the judgment-that is, any rational opinion-as 
concrete; and the process of judgment as beginning in the 
subject with what is already a system, and exposing the na- 
ture of the system in the course of judging and reasoning, 
distinguishing its elements and deepening its unity by the 
same movement. 
Again, on the epistemological side, the “that,” o r  real 
being, of the object of knowledge is held to  be distinct from 
its “what,” o r  its qualities; and judgment is made to  consist 
in bringing these together. And, further, as I have already 
indicated, knowledge itself is separated into forced abstrac- 
tions, and the content is assumed to  come from the data, 
while the form is supplied by the activity of the subject. T h e  
consequence is that knowledge and reality themselves remain 
in inexplicable opposition, and truth is in fundamental contra- 
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diction with itself. Fo r  it is assumed that to  agree with or to 
represent the real as it is, it must cease to be as truth, and be 
merged in the real, or else be transmuted in an unknowable 
way by an unknowable Absolute. 
But such results indicate the need, not of escaping from 
methodical thought by means of mystic and methodless in- 
tuition, but of recognizing that thought is always systematic 
and its object always a One in the Many, and therefore of 
ceasing to set the dualistic problems which baffle all attempts 
at solution. 
T h e  second main obstacle, and possibly the more serious 
in practice, may be called ethical. I t  is assumed, to put the 
matter as directly and concisely as I can, that the ethical 
world will disappear if man is not the genuine creator of his 
own actions, o r  absolutely spontaneous; and, further, that 
his creative power o r  spontaneity must mean that he stands 
apart and absolutely isolated from the so-called outer world. 
H e  is a pure subject, as represented by Kant, ontologically 
separate from all objects, and even from himse2f when he is 
the object of his own knowledge-his knowing self falling 
into the noumenal, and his known self into the phenomenal 
world. W e  are jealous, and rightly jealous, of our own in- 
trinsic individuality, and assume that in order to  maintain it 
we must hold the world, so to  speak, at arm’s length and ex- 
trude it. Let the outer conditions, and even our own past 
history, be what they will, we must at any moment have the 
power of acting upon it and from it in a manner that, for all 
computation, must be contingent. “Contingency,” as we 
have seen, must be “let into the heart of things.” T h e  inner 
life shuts out the outer world; o r  if it shuts it in or comprises 
it, it is only in the form of “experience”-that is, of 
thoughts, feelings and volitions-and its realities become 
“phenomena.” W e  have “gone back to  Kant,” and we still 
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dwell among his contradictions, for  we have not gone for- 
ward from Kant. 
Now I have no desire to  minimize or  to  obscure in the 
least degree the privacy of personality, o r  the subjective and 
intensely individual character of all experience. On  the con- 
trary, there is no apparent excuse into which I would not 
follow the solipsist in this direction. All experience is in the 
fullest sense individual, and there is no such thing as univer- 
sal experience in the sense that one finite man can think the 
thoughts or  will the volitions of another. Every man’s 
thoughts and every man’s volitions are  exclusively his own, 
and no other’s; they remain his own even if it be true, as it 
is, that other men may know the same truth and will to  bring 
about the same change. 
When the idealist, in endeavoring to  meet the evident 
objections to solipsism, affirms that a man’s mind is not a 
particular thing, like his pocket-knife, but has a universal 
nature, which makes his mind one in intrinsic structure, sub- 
ject to  the same laws, active in the same manner as all minds, 
o r  as mind “as such,” I have no concern in contradicting 
him. But such an argument does not obviate the difficulties 
of solipsism. However universal in nature a man’s mind 
may be, it does not lose its intensely private and personal 
character, and all his experiences are his own in a sense that 
is exclusive. In  other words, the subjective, personal,  pri- 
vate character of experience remains, and every mind looks 
at  the world with its own eyes. Were  all men, like the gods, 
possessors of the real truth of all reality, their thoughts 
would still be their own; and were all human wills one with 
the will of God, they would still be personal wills and the 
moral perfection would be their own. 
T h e  reputation of the solipsist is implied in his own prem- 
ises. There is no solipsist who in making an affirmative does 
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not consider that his affirmation refers to, and is an ideal 
construction o r  representation of, reality. H e  is expressing 
his own thoughts of the real, and his thoughts are his own. 
But, unless he confuses the results of his thinking with that 
about which he is thinking, and the object which he strives 
to comprehend with the products of his effort, he will not 
maintain that the real about which he thinks is also subjec- 
tive. H e  cannot a t  the same time profess that he is express- 
ing the truth and maintain that he is not dealing with the 
real. H i s  thoughts, however subjective, have an objective 
reference, and however personal and private, they are his 
personal and private conception of that which is. Truth,  
affirmation, negation, judgment have in every instance this 
reference to  the  real. T h e  reference is direct in every ex- 
perience, and the reference is always to the real-that is, for 
each mind, to only one real, 
Hence every solipsist considers that he knows the truth: 
and it is not possible to  affirm o r  deny except on this presup- 
position. T h e  question of agreement o r  disagreement is 
subsequent and secondary. W h a t  concerns us now is the 
universal and necessary character of every experience, how- 
ever personal. T h e  reference of a judgment is not to a pri- 
vate real ; not even when he says, “This is only my opinion.” 
Even that statement is a statement of a fact. And it is al- 
leged that the result of the dealing of different minds is a 
different experience, o r  as many opinions as there are minds. 
Still, each mind in every affirmation refers to  what is real, o r  
to  what his thought represents o r  misrepresents. 
N o r  can it be affirmed that each subject refers to a differ- 
ent reality, a reality infected with the illusions of his own 
thought. Once more it is the result that may be illusory, o r  
merely phenomenal. And, as we have seen, the results of 
knowing cannot be the data of knowledge; nor have they 
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any existence except as ways of the activity of the cognizing 
subject. Phenomena do not constitute a class of existing 
things, over and above the subjects which know, and the real- 
ity which the subjects endeavor to know. 
Thus  every experience is bipolar. I t  is the living relation 
or interaction of two elements of a reality which is a t  once 
spiritual and natural. Knowing and willing is the act of the 
self by means of this world and of the real world. For  no 
existence can refer to  any other. 
T h e  question of the agreement or disagreement of the dif- 
ferent experiences, or of any community between them, is 
subsequent and secondary to  the reference of each experience 
to  the real, which every judgment is. And it also concerns 
reality, which is capable once more of being rightly or 
wrongly interpreted. And the real is in this and every other 
case the criterion of what is held to be true o r  false. So that 
the reality also is assumed in every experience, in every act 
of cognition, to  be bipolar. I t  is, and it is capable of express- 
ing itself subjectively to the knowing mind. Reality, we may 
perhaps be allowed to  say, expresses itself in many self-con- 
scious foci and in many degrees of accuracy and fullness. 
But the presupposition of the real-that is, of one single 
reality-is as inevitable to  every subject as the presupposi- 
tion of his own existence. 
When the solipsist, therefore, affirms that every subject 
has his own experience, which is true, he overlooks the fact 
that the object with which each experience deals o r  which it 
endeavors to represent is that which is. No subject can as- 
sume that there are as many systems of reality as there are 
interpretations of i t ;  he denies to  the experience of others 
that which is essential to  his own and to the very possibility 
of experience. 
254 Philosophical Landmarks 
I t  follows from this that  there is one criterion for  all ex- 
perience, and one ideal. I t  is reality. I t  is by constant refer- 
ence to it that he corrects and extends his own, and affirms 
or  denies the truth of the experience of others: for  their 
expressions of it are also objects for  him, and parts of the 
reality which he endeavors to  know. And the reference to  
the real is a reference to the Absolute-that is, to  that which 
is all in all and exists in its own right. I t  is by their seeming 
congruence o r  incongruence with the presupposed whole of 
reality that particular opinions are called true or  false. But 
this is as much as to  say that reality is held to  be a systematic 
whole, within which each particular fact has its own place 
and function. If we work to  correct another person of error 
in any judgment, we do so by compelling him to choose be- 
tween that opinion and his interpretation of that which is 
real. T h e  admission of a new truth may compel us 
to revise our conception of the system of reality. A 
new hypothesis may carry with it a revolution in our view 
of reality; but the reality which is the aim of our intellectual 
attempt, and the criterion of the value of its results, is no 
new reality. I t  is not true, therefore, that  there are as many 
realities as there are  opinions of reality; although there may 
be as many interpretations of it as there are cognitive sub- 
jects. On the contrary, each subject is necessarily assumed 
to be from his own standpoint endeavoring to interpret the 
world of reality. Experience, false o r  true, has otherwise no 
meaning. 
I t  is this truth that Spinoza expressed when he said that 
knowledge is adequate in the degree in which the subject of 
knowledge contemplates objects sub specie &ternitatis. And 
the moral life of man-that is, his practical life when con- 
sidered in the light of its ultimate issues-gives an interesting 
illustration of this truth. For  morality also carries within at 
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all times this immediate reference to  the Absolute. T h e  
action may be, and always is, particular in one of its aspects. 
But it is also a particularized universal. T h e  right action is 
a specific affirmation, and the wrong action is a specific viola- 
tion, of a Universal Good. T h e  right action may be in itself 
insignificant-the mere giving of a cup of cold water; but 
being right, it is what is required in that particular context, 
and neither gods nor men can improve upon it. I t  is the 
particular reification or incarnation of the best. I t  is doing 
the work of God, in the language of religion. I t  is accord 
with the nature of things. And thereby it acquires inex- 
haustible worth and power. 
Hence issues the dignity of an act which we call good, and 
the splendor which cannot be obscured. Hence also flows 
the sense of unconquerable strength which the moral agent 
always feels when he is in his duty. T h e  nature of things is 
at his back. God is with him. H i s  will is one with the 
divine. I t  must prevail. Its language always is, “If God be 
with us, who can be against us?” 
Both in cognition and volition, therefore, both in know- 
ledge and in morality, once we have freed ourselves of the 
fixed abstractions of the understanding, we find that imme- 
diate continuity with reality which is our own life; and the 
service of the true and the good, being the service of what is 
real, is the service of freedom so perfect that it finds no- 
where aught that can limit or obstruct it. T h e  service is 
fuller, the closer and the wider our communion with what is 
real ; and the natural cosmos, in all its wealth, is not a limit 
but a condition of the life of our own spirit, and the living 
partner in all our spiritual enterprises. 
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